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Editor’s Introduction
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:2 is a combined issue. Part I is a symposium of
invited commentaries on the report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force; Part II
features three articles on various aspects of genocide.
Part I: Commentaries
The Genocide Prevention Task Force was officially launched in November 2007 by a
consortium of non-governmental agencies—the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the
American Academy of Diplomacy, and the US Institute of Peace—under the joint
chairmanship of Madeleine Albright and William Cohen. Albright served as US
ambassador to the United Nations and then as secretary of state during the Bil Clinton
administration, while Cohen was secretary of defense during Clinton’s second term.
Participants in the task force, including consultants, were more than fifty people with
international, diplomatic, political, government, military, academic, humanitarian,
and other relevant experience.
The task force’s mandate is explained in the title of its official report, Preventing
Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. The co-chairs explain in their foreword,
This report provides a blueprint that can enable the United States to take preventive
action, along with international partners, to forestall the specter of future cases of
genocide and mass atrocities. The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet
genocide and mass killings continue. Our challenge is to match words to deeds and stop
allowing the unacceptable.1
Since the task force’s report was deemed byGSP’s editors to be an important event,
we thought we should invite a diverse set of commentaries on the report from as many
perspectives as possible. A symposium held in Washington, DC, was co-organized by
the International Association of Genocide Scholars, the International Institute for
Genocide and Human Rights Studies (A Division of the Zoryan Institute), and the
editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal.
The objective of this one-day symposium was to assemble a group of experts in
genocide and international human rights from various disciplines and countries to
provide an independent, in-depth, scholarly review and assessment of the report’s
findings and implications. The commentaries that follow were contributed by experts
from at least four countries and provide a diversity of views. They range from in-depth
scholarly analyses to editorial-style opinion pieces, reflecting different approaches to
the report by the various commentators, and provide a series of stimulating views on
the task force report that will, we hope, stimulate further attention and discussion.
The symposium begins with a broad critique by Hirsch in which he notes five
overall problems with the report:
(1) It is poorly written and filled with bureaucratic jargon.
(2) It is historically inaccurate and, in some discussions, almost revisionist.
Hirsch argues that because of this weak analysis of the recent history of
genocide, the report cannot serve as a foundation for adequate policy.
(3) It was written and edited by individuals who participated in past policy
failures as their attempts to prevent genocide either failed or were not
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undertaken. This is part, Hirsch notes, of a ‘‘recycling’’ process in the capital
whereby policy makers never achieve a new perspective because former
members of previous administrations are recalled when a new administration
enters office, which makes it difficult for new or different views to be
represented.
(4) Reports by commissions often do not change policy; sometimes they do not
even influence policy. Often, in government, the presence of a report is pointed
to as the equivalent of policy. This is a form of cooptation: in place of taking
action, policy makers focus on the report.
(5) The ‘‘clashing cultures’’ of the academy and the policy makers may contribute
to different perspectives, with academics taking a more analytic and critical
view and policy makers arguing that they are more ‘‘practical.’’ In any case,
Hirsch argues, these are critical weaknesses that must be addressed if this
report is to influence policy.
Following this broad critique, we move on to more specific analyses. Since the
report is directed at US policy, we thought it would be enlightening to include
perspectives from European and Latin American genocide scholars. Interestingly,
their views were quite divergent.
We begin with what might be termed a ‘‘Latin American’’ perspective. Daniel
Feierstein, director of the Center of Genocide Studies, Universidad Nacional de Tres de
Febrero, and a professor at the Universidad de Buenos Aries, Argentina, argues
that ‘‘from a Latin American perspective,’’ the report is ‘‘interesting but confusing.’’
He contends that the report is ‘‘embedded’’ in the values of ‘‘American society’’ and that
this makes it ‘‘difficult for outsiders to evaluate [it] as an action plan.’’ Feierstein’s
primary criticism is not so much what the report says but what it leaves out—that is,
what it does not discuss ‘‘about the causes of genocide and ways of preventing it.’’
In particular, Feierstein refers to what he calls the ‘‘active role played by US
governments in promoting such practices in the first place.’’ In fact, he points out that
‘‘anyone living in a Third World country in Latin America, Southeast Asia, or Africa
would find almost laughable the idea, mentioned earlier, that the main problem of the
United States with respect to genocide has been ‘non-intervention.’’’ It is a common
belief in the rest of the world that reduced US intervention has actually led to a
‘‘significant reduction in the systematic processes of mass murder in recent years.’’
Ultimately, Feierstein believes that the report is ‘‘profoundly ethnocentric.’’
While his analysis is primarily critical, Feierstein does note that there are ‘‘some
positive aspects to the report,’’ including a willingness to broaden the definition of
genocide and calls for ‘‘establishing systems of risk assessments and early warning of
genocide around the world’’ and preventing arms sales to places or groups where there
is a risk of genocide.
Feierstein concludes by noting that any attempt to prevent genocide must address
two problems: ‘‘(a) what the United States can and should do to prevent genocide; and
(b) what the United States should stop doing.’’ He is not the only one of the
commentators to note this problem with the report; his perspective as a Latin
American scholar likely makes the problem much more obvious and, therefore,
contributes an additional and important dimension to the analysis of the report.
A second non-US analysis, much less critical of the report, is contributed by
Jacques Se´melin, professor of political science (Center for International Research and
Studies, Sciences Po, Paris) and founder and editor-in-chief of the online Encyclopedia
of Mass Violence.2
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Se´melin believes that the report is an event of ‘‘great significance in the field of
genocide studies.’’ This is so, he believes, because it is
the first time that a group of experts, mainly former high officials, former diplomats,
generals, and members of Congress, have worked together in order to propose a
coherent and well-argued list of recommendations to a state so that its government will
play a major role in preventing genocide throughout the world.
He does note that few genocide scholars or NGO members were consulted, and he
points out—echoing Feierstein’s critique—that the report is ‘‘an American event.’’
Semelin argues that the report is important, moreover, as ‘‘an answer’’ to past
inaction by the United States in preventing genocide and as a ‘‘way for America to say
‘never again’’’—forgetting, as others have noted, that saying ‘‘never again’’ has not
meant that genocide will ‘‘never again’’ be committed. Se´melin comments on the six
parts of the report and concludes that there still remain significant problems; in
particular, the United States, according to Se´melin, can hardly claim to be a moral or
political leader in genocide prevention without joining the International Criminal
Court. Se´melin concludes that while its future impact cannot be foreseen, the report
‘‘will stand as a first and promising step.’’
The third commentary, also from a Europe-based scholar, shifts the focus to
international law. Martin Mennecke, presently a visiting professor of international
law at Washington and Lee University, views the report as ‘‘a welcome addition to the
growing efforts’’ in the area of genocide prevention and would like to see European
institutions concerned with this topic engage in a similar exercise. Mennecke’s basic
critique is that the ‘‘treatment of international law in [the report] remains inconsistent
and insufficient. Most often law is reduced to ‘international political challenges’ or less
than that.’’ He argues that the report should have explored ‘‘how recent trends in
international law could contribute and shape future policies in the field of genocide
prevention.’’ Like most of our other commentators, Mennecke notes that, ‘‘overall,
there is little self-critical assessment of past US policies vis-a`-vis international law.’’
The report, he contends, focuses primarily on political considerations and appears to
view international law as a ‘‘secondary category.’’
Mennecke concludes that while it has a ‘‘number of shortcomings,’’ the report at
least puts genocide prevention on the agenda.
The final comment from a non-US-based scholar continues the focus on
international law. William A. Schabas, professor of human rights law at the
National University of Ireland, Galway, and director of the Irish Centre for Human
Rights (along with several other positions), is a leading international expert on
international law and genocide prevention. Schabas notes that the report states an
intent to avoid the problems associated with the term ‘‘genocide’’ by referring instead
to ‘‘mass atrocities,’’ which would include genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. This is, as Schabas notes, an old debate, and the report is misleading if its
intent was to examine ‘‘genocide and mass atrocity’’ instead of genocide alone.
These definitional issues are important, according to Schabas, because as a result
of ‘‘the limitations on the definitions of crimes against humanity and genocide adopted
in the aftermath of World War II, from the 1940s until the 1990s there were important
gaps in the ability of international law to deal with atrocities.’’ Schabas considers this
no longer the case, because the evolution of international law now means that ‘‘crimes
against humanity’’ addresses a broader range of atrocities than ‘‘genocide.’’ It also
means, he notes, that ‘‘what the Albright-Cohen task force is talking about is ‘crimes
against humanity,’ not ‘genocide.’’’ Schabas therefore believes that the task force has
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engaged in a ‘‘form of deception’’: ‘‘they are using one term, whose definition is well
recognized and well accepted in international law, to replace another.’’ This is
important, as he notes, because ‘‘words matter.’’
Schabas concludes that while the report is addressed to the US government, it
concerns all, since the United States remains the most powerful nation; and the report
is very short on multilateralism. ‘‘Most countries,’’ he points out, ‘‘would expect that
initiatives to prevent genocide should originate from the United Nations in New York,
not from the Department of State and the Pentagon in Washington.’’ Finally, Schabas
opines that the new Barack Obama administration in Washington should not endorse
the report:
An endorsement of the Albright-Cohen Report may be a step in the wrong direction . . .
given the report’s exaggerated emphasis on the use of force and its cavalier dismissal of
important legal distinctions . . . Prevention of genocide (and of mass atrocity) will result
from stronger international institutions, in particular the United Nations and the
International Criminal Court, not from the threat of unilateral military action by the
United States.
The last three analyses are written by US scholars of genocide. As one might
expect, their views are divergent, and they concentrate on different aspects of
the report.
Scott Straus, a political scientist from the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
argues that the ‘‘contents of the report are a decisive step forward in the debate over
how to prevent . . . genocide’’; he believes the report is insightful and provides policy
options that are ‘‘concrete and sensible.’’ Straus identifies what he refers to as ‘‘five
areas of specific strength’’: identifying a coherent policy, providing a ‘‘comprehensive
strategic approach,’’ making short-term recommendations, identifying a ‘‘series of
specific coercive and non-coercive measures that can be taken to prevent genocide,’’
and engaging and incorporating ‘‘scholarship and debates in the genocide studies
field.’’
Even a quick reading of the discussion up to this point will make clear that Straus
is at odds with some of our earlier commentators. In addition to disagreeing on
the strengths he reports, some of the early analysis takes a diametrically opposed
view. In fact, however, Straus also identifies several weaknesses. The primary
weakness, also noted by Schabas and others, is that the report places too little
emphasis on multilateral action with US cooperation and too much on unilateral US
action, which, as Straus notes, misses an important opportunity to reinforce
international doctrine.
The second commentary from a US genocide scholar is directed at some of the
unstated and faulty assumptions upon which the report is based. Alan Kuperman,
associate professor of public affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of
Texas at Austin, notes that ‘‘good intentions may be necessary, but they are not
sufficient, to prevent genocide.’’ The unstated and flawed assumptions upon which the
report is based therefore constitute, according to Kuperman, a ‘‘recipe for failure.’’
While the report offers ‘‘several constructive reforms,’’ Kuperman believes that
overall . . . the report ignores the most profound lessons of past failures, declines to
make the hard choices on policy dilemmas, and neglects to call for the costly military
reforms that could enable intervention to prevent future genocides. A more realistic
assessment of these challenges gives rise to a very different set of recommendations
than found in the report.
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Kuperman concludes, rather starkly, that ‘‘the Albright-Cohen recommendations
cannot achieve their stated goal and therefore need to be augmented.’’
The final analysis of the Albright-Cohen Report broadens the perspective from
political science and international law to a more philosophical analysis. Henry
Theriault, associate professor of philosophy at Worcester State College in
Massachusetts, notes that the report is based—as Kuperman also argues—on faulty
assumptions and a questionable interpretation of past history. These lead to a view of
genocide that is essentially limited and ‘‘discounts precisely the kinds of genocide that
the United States and other great powers are typically involved in.’’ This view is tied to
a more comprehensive critique in which Theriault points out instances in which the
United States not only knew genocide was being committed but, in several cases,
actively supported such action. As a result, according to Theriault, ‘‘the report
consistently ignores the foregoing issues, instead presenting the US relationship to
genocide as one of mistaken inaction and unfortunate indifference.’’
Theriault relentlessly highlights the report’s consistent misrepresentation of US
policy toward genocide, which goes so far as to ignore the founding genocide upon
which the country was established—the genocide of Native Americans. In the absence
of a forthright acknowledgment the United States’ own role in supporting and
committing genocidal acts, he argues, the report is constructed on false assumptions
and reconstructed history, which cannot serve as the foundation for a successful policy
of prevention.
After additional critical analysis, Theriault concludes by offering a series of
recommendations that he believes are more likely than those in the report to set the
United States on a path toward preventing genocide.
From a simple summary of the commentaries, it is obvious that the contributors to
this symposium have a wide range of views on the historical accuracy and the possible
impact of the report and of its recommendations. We, the GSP editors, hope to circulate
this issue with these commentaries to the original authors of the report and, in a
future issue, invite them to respond to the analysis presented above. In this fashion,
we hope to stimulate a dialogue between what I have referred to as the two ‘‘competing
cultures’’ of academics and policy makers. The success or failure of this endeavor, of
course, depends upon the willingness of the report’s authors to respond and to consider
the analysis presented above.
Part II: Three Articles on Genocide
As noted above, this issue also includes three original research articles on three
different aspects of genocide. The first argues that there is, in fact, something called
‘‘intergenerational moral responsibility.’’ Armen Marsoobian, professor of philosophy
at Southern Connecticut State University, constructs an argument ‘‘for the claim that
we are morally responsible (in the qualified sense proposed in the article) for the
crimes of our ancestors if our ancestors, as a collectivity, were part of a community for
whose sake and in whose name crimes were committed that meet the definition of the
crime of genocide.’’
Marsoobian posits two arguments to support this view. The first involves the idea
that collectivities have an identity across time; the second involves the notion that
large collectivities, such as nations, provide ‘‘moral reliability’’ within which
individuals may function and on which they count to support their values. This
means, he argues, that individuals have a moral responsibility ‘‘not to the past per se
but to the past as it play an active role in the present.’’
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Marsoobian’s interesting philosophical analysis is followed by a more conventional
examination of failure to prevent genocide in three cases: Rwanda, Srebrenica, and
Darfur. Fred Gru¨nfeld, of the University of Maastricht Faculty of Law, University
College Maastricht, the Netherlands, and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights,
and Wessel Vermeulen, a research assistant to Dr. Grunfeld, argue that in spite of
ample warnings, the UN Security Council was not willing to take any action to prevent
genocide or to stop the genocide taking place in these three contexts.
The final article examines the attempts to identify missing persons in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Kirsten Juhl, research fellow at the University of Stavanger, Norway,
argues that it is important to solve the missing-persons issue in the aftermath of
genocide and that this may be a ‘‘prerequisite to prevent recurrences.’’
Juhl’s analysis examines missing-persons issues from what she calls a ‘‘risk
management and societal safety perspective.’’ Very important is the ‘‘state’s ability to
establish public confidence in critical social institutions and to build mutual trust
among different groups within the population.’’ Her study is based on empirical data
and considers, as she notes, ‘‘how the emotional overrules the rational, how the
predominantly ethnic discourse in society overpowers the weaker human-rights
discourse, and how this may threaten the important building of confidence and trust.’’
! ! !
GSP 4:2 is thus a heterogeneous mix of commentaries and wide-ranging
substantive articles. The commentaries elucidate and draw attention to the short-
comings as well as the positive contributions of the Albright-Cohen Report, while the
three articles raise a series of interesting questions and provide some new perspectives
on the study of genocide. As noted above, in a future issue the editors will invite the
authors of the Albright-Cohen Report to respond to the commentaries published in this
issue. We hope that you, the reader, will look forward to these with the same
anticipation of a productive debate that characterizes the editors.
Herb Hirsch
GSP Co-editor
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Notice of Errata
In GSP 3.3 (December 2008), pp. 341–52, Henry Maitles is identified as sole author of the
article titled ‘‘Why are we learning this?’: Does Studying the Holocaust Encourage Better
Citizenship Values?’; in fact, however, Paula Cowan (University of the West of Scotland)
should also have been identified as an author of this article. Henry Maitles regrets the error.
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